



I am very grateful to Rostam Neuwirth, Surabhi
Ranganathan,
Wolfgang Thierse and Lea Wisken for taking the time to engage with my book
in such a thoughtful and constructive manner. I would also like to thank the
Völkerrechtsblog, and in particular, Sebastian Spitra, for arranging this symposium
and Valentina Kleinsasser for translating the interview with Wolfgang Thierse.
The four contributions raise many more points and questions than I have space
to address. Thus, in this concluding part of the symposium I can regrettably only
engage with a few selected observations. Before I do so, it might be useful to
address a certain uneasiness with the concept of a dilemma that appears to inform,
in one way or another, all contributions to this symposium. Lea Wisken writes that
the acknowledgement of dilemmas could have ‘harsh’ consequences. Surabhi
Ranganathan expresses ‘some discomfort’ with the romanticisation of the concept of
a dilemma. Rostam Neuwirth links the experience of dilemmatic norm conflicts to a
deficient understanding of the world. Wolfgang Thierse expresses gratitude that most
decisions are not of dilemmatic character and speaks of the agony that decisions of
that kind entail. Even Tim Heath, the actor playing the Prime Minister in the short film
Aporia, was initially very reluctant to embrace the film’s dilemmatic decision-making
process.
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I share this hesitation and uneasiness. The argument in favour of the concept of
a dilemma is not the kind of enthusiastic battle-cry with which Gandalf may have
led Erkenbrand’s swordsmen into the fight against the Orcs at Helm’s Deep. The
argument in favour of recognising dilemmas is rather (or is meant to be), a more
pensive, and possibly slightly resigned, acknowledgement that in light of all the other
alternatives, legal dilemmas are the best, though certainly sub-optimal, mechanism
of dealing with norm conflicts that international law’s otherwise existing norm conflict
resolution devises cannot deal with. As Surabhi Ranganathan points out, I do put
forward a normative argument in favour of the acknowledgement of the possibility
of legal dilemmas. But the normative justifications underlying that argument are
very much tied to the characteristics of the contemporary international legal order.
In other words, I am not sure that there is something inherently good about legal
dilemmas, just as I am not sure that a human existence without the need to make
difficult decisions would necessarily be desirable. I am also less certain than Rostam
Neuwirth that, as humans and technology advance, legal dilemmas will occur initially
more and eventually less frequently. The normativity of my argument is not informed
by an aspiration to move towards a new legal order or to return to an old one. Like
the considerations that inform the decision-making process sketched by Wolfgang
Thierse, my argument is (for the most part) not meant to be an exercise of blue-
sky thinking, but merely aims at making the present legal order work within the
parameters that the present order aspires to satisfy.
With this last observation in mind, I turn now to Lea Wisken’s concern that few
actors might be willing to volunteer for the coast guard, or, by extension, to assume
positions of responsibility if such positions entail the risk of encountering dilemmas
that cannot be escaped by lawful means. Having to rely on the mercy of other actors
in circumstances where no lawful course of conduct was available is, according to
Wisken, ‘harsh’. I agree. And yet I do not think that this ‘harshness’ is a sufficiently
good reason to call the concept of a legal dilemma into question for at least two
reasons. The first reason relates to the disclaimer above concerning the argument’s
normative aspirations. Since the argument is conditioned by the current state of
the international legal order, the argument absolutely and explicitly allows for legal
norms to be modified in such a manner that legal dilemmas disappear. In fact, the
‘harshness’, the ‘unfairness’ of legal dilemmas can act as an incentive for states and
lawmakers to adjust the legal order so that it becomes less harsh and more fair. For
example, if states want to change the norms governing the use of nuclear weapons
they can absolutely do so. If obligations of result, for example in the context of the
SOLAS Convention, were to be replaced by obligations of conduct or by obligations
of due diligence, many potentially dilemmatic situations could be avoided. So, while
I acknowledge the potentially harsh consequences of legal dilemmas, I believe
that steps to remedy this harshness should be taken at the legislative / law-making
level and not in the court room. This argument is strictly limited to dilemmatic norm-
conflicts and does not deny the otherwise important function of judicial law-making
and judicial development of law.
One might of course object that a modification of conflicting norms is not always
possible or that it is at least beyond the competence of a particular actor confronting
a dilemma. This is correct. However, and this is the second reason why concerns
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of ‘unfairness’ and ‘harshness’ do not undermine the concept of a legal dilemma,
a certain ‘harshness’ is inevitable in human and legal life. Wolfgang Thierse said,
slightly uncompromisingly, ‘those who do not tolerate the heat should stay out of
the kitchen’. By extension one might say that those who are afraid of the inevitable
harshness of taking decisions should not take decisions. At least in the sphere of
public international law (and this argument admittedly works much less well in a
domestic or private law context) few actors are forced into positions of responsibility.
It is thus not unreasonable to argue that decision-makers should accept the
unpleasant consequences that any decision-making process at times entails.
Lea Wisken’s second observation concerning the structural bias of legal dilemmas
in favour of permissive norms connects to Surabhi Ranganathan’s suspicion that
the book might be more informed by consequentialist arguments than it is willing
to admit. Lea Wisken remarks that political leaders might be incentivised to opt
for exercising rights rather than permissions since the negative consequences
attached to the exercise of a right might be less severe than the consequences
attached to the compliance with a prescriptive norm. Surabhi Ranganathan suggests
that my preference for political actors to decide dilemmas might be based on
consequentialist considerations. My response to Lea Wisken’s concern would be
that my argument, probably like most mainstream legal arguments, does indeed
blank-out consequentialist arguments. Whether the compliance with a prescriptive
norm is more or less desirable than exercising a right is, from a legal point of view,
difficult to assess. What matters is whether or not a specific course of conduct is
allowed / prescribed. I think I can insist on the relative disregard for consequentialist
concerns in my response to Lea Wisken without risking inconsistency with respect to
my argument in favour of the sovereign decision of dilemmas in response to Surabhi
Ranganathan’s comment.
Ranganathan is of course absolutely correct when she points out that the book’s
argument does not entirely shy away from advancing consequentialist arguments.
Political decisions of dilemmas, the book argues, lead to better outcomes, the judicial
decision of dilemmas can have detrimental knock-on effects on the integrity of and
respect for international law. However, the main argument in favour of the position
that judges should not decide dilemmas is based on a black-letter analysis of
contemporary international law: the decision of a legal dilemma under circumstances
where international law’s norm conflict resolution and accommodation devices have
been unable to identify a priority or comprise between conflicting norms would be
an explicit act of judicial norm-making which is, by default, impermissible. I have
encountered judges that have said it is their job to ensure that legal dilemmas
do not arise. I believe that the opinion of these judges is incompatible with the
wording, and the object and purpose of the statutes of most, if not all, international
courts and tribunals. Naturally, one can have an extended debate concerning
the possibility of any norm conflict surviving rigorous harmonious interpretation
exercises, norm conflict resolution principles etc. But if one accepts the possibility
of a legal dilemma and if one assumes that explicit law-making exceeds the judicial
function of international judges, then, based on international law, irresolvable norm
conflicts must be decided not by judges but by political actors. In a world where
sovereign behaviour leaves much to be desired an argument ‘carrying a strong whiff
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of concession to state sovereignty’ (Ranganathan) must of course be used with
caution.
Thus, I agree with a second observation by Surabhi Ranganathan relating to the
suitability of dilemmatic arguments in all contexts. As pointed out in connection
with the interview with Wolfgang Thierse, most decisions decision-makers confront
are probably not of dilemmatic nature. Likewise, I would be hesitant to refer to
conflicts between ‘slow-burning ecological realities and concrete political economies’
as dilemmas. A legal dilemma, in accordance with the definition offered in the
book, exists only where an actor confronts an irresolvable and unavoidable
conflict between at least two legal norms so that obeying or applying one norm
necessarily entails the undue impairment of the other. Most of the tensions between
environmental and economic norms referred to by Surabhi Ranganathan do not
satisfy this definition. Often, the soft-law environmental norms cannot yet compete
with the norms of well-established economic regimes, or states simply choose to
disregard existing environmental obligations. So quite apart from the fact that I fully
agree with Ranganathan that it matters ‘how we choose to describe situations’,
describing the conflicts between ecological necessities and economic desiderata as
a legal dilemma is – at least based on the book – not even an option.
Surabhi Ranganathan’s observation is a reminder of the potential risks associated
with invoking the language of dilemmas too liberally. This risk exists in particular
with respect to concepts like paradoxes or oxymora which Rostam Neuwirth
discusses. The occurrence of a legal dilemma can coincide with the occurrence
of an oxymoron but it does not necessarily do so. On the one hand there is, for
example, nothing oxymoronic about a conflict of norms belonging to two different
treaties or legal regimes. On the other hand, when two provisions of the same
treaty are contradictory or when a contradictory judicial decision would be issued, it
could be justifiable to speak of oxymora. In general, many of the oxymora Neuwirth
mentions are likely to form part of the normative background that could facilitate the
emergence of legal dilemmas. Indeed, some dilemmas may result from inherent,
structural tensions within international law, such as the constant oscillation between
the need to apologetically reflect State behaviour and to simultaneously prescribe
normative conduct ‘without being able to establish itself permanently in either
position’ (Koskenniemi, FATU, 65). I suspect some of these inherent tensions
and paradoxes are an integral part of the human existence and I am not sure that
adjusting our ‘mode of reasoning’ in light of current developments will necessarily
help us deal with dilemmas better. But it is certainly the case, as Rostam Neuwirth
points out, that novel technologies, in particular, challenge orthodox ways of
categorising conduct and concepts. And if this challenge is not negotiated carefully,
if sovereigns do not ‘adapt the laws to the changing realities’ (Neuwirth), dilemmas
could certainly arise whenever the legal matrix is ill-equipped to account for changing
social realities.
Eventually, it is lawmakers who are tasked with adapting laws to changing realities
and who must decide if and how certain dilemmas should be decided. The book
argues that, compared to judicial actors, politicians are best placed to take decisions
of this kind. Apart from the legal reasons mentioned to above, the book also refers
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to the different kind of proximity that exists between a political decision-maker and
those affected by a political decision-maker’s decision and between judicial actors
and those affected by judicial actors’ decisions. In the interview, Wolfgang Thierse,
for example, speaks of the public echo of a decision which ‘rains down upon’ the
decision-maker from all directions. This proximity does not compare to the explicit
lack of proximity between judicial actors and the persons who are affected by a
judicial decision. Thierse’s remarks also appeared to be informed by the conviction
that political decision-makers are individually responsible, accountable for the
decisions they take. ‘The law does not decide anything’, he said, it merely guides
the decision-making process. Ultimately, it is the human subject that, after agonising
moments of doubt, takes a decision knowing that decisions in dilemmatic situations
entail an element of arbitrariness. When faced with novel situations, a politician can
legitimately sail the waters beyond law’s horizon, can rely on instinct, can ‘jump’,
as Thierse said, and can, afterwards, try to undo, to modify decisions when it turns
out that they did not have the intended effects. Most importantly, perhaps, Thierse
acknowledges that any decision entails an element of guilt, of responsibility. It is
impossible to satisfy everyone’s interests and it is also impossible to know, in the
moment of decision, if the decision was absolutely right or wrong. For good reasons,
one would not describe judicial decision-making processes in similar terms. And
yet, it might be argued that I am overstating the benefits of political decision-making
processes in dilemmatic circumstances. It is important in this regard to remember
that I am making this argument explicitly and exclusively with respect to situations
where it is impossible to establish a priority or a compromise between two conflicting
legal norms. Only with respect to such situations do I argue that relatively more
accountable politicians are better placed to decide how to deal with conflicts of this
kind.
In the course of writing the book and in the course of this exchange on the
Völkerrechtsblog judicial actors were often referred to but their own voice was hardly
ever heard. While I did attempt to interview international judges in preparation for
this symposium, it turned out to be significantly more difficult to get in contact with
judges. Compared to politicians, they have no public e-mail addresses or phone
numbers. Those judges that I did manage to speak to were understandably hesitant
to reflect publicly about the way in which they (would) issue judgments on some of
international law’s most controversial legal questions. There are generally very good
reasons for not displaying the contact information for judges in public and there are
good reasons for judges not to talk extra-judicially at length with a junior academic
(or indeed anyone!) about what goes on in judicial deliberation rooms. But it is for
exactly those reasons that I think judges are not best-placed to decide dilemmatic
norm conflicts. They are legal professionals who are responsible for pronouncing
upon the state of law and to decide disputes based on law. Deciding irresolvable
norm conflicts is too heavy a burden to carry for them and for the international legal
order.
At the beginning of this post I acknowledged a certain discomfort with the concept of
a legal dilemma. While this discomfort has been a faithful companion for a few years
now, the persistent cognitive dissonance triggered by dilemmatic thinking is more
than offset by the numerous, pleasant, enriching, sometimes helpfully confusing,
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conversations and encounters that I have had since the first days of engaging with
dilemmas. This book symposium was one of those encounters. I enjoyed it greatly
and I would like to thank, once again, Rostam Neuwirth, Surabhi Ranganathan,
Wolfgang Thierse, Lea Wisken, Sebastian Spitra and Valentina Kleinsasser for
making this discussion happen.
 
Valentin Jeutner is an Associate Senior Lecturer in Law at Lund University, Sweden.
 
Cite as: Valentin Jeutner, “Dilemmatic Discomfort: Author’s Response”,
Völkerrechtsblog, 8 July 2019.
- 6 -
